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Abstract
The American NASP programme — National Aero Space Plane — is a good
illustration of the evolutionary dilemma between variety and standardization in the
management of mission-oriented R&D. This dilemma relates to the trade-off between
the need to explore the technological diversity in order to avoid the risk of being locked-
in on the wrong technological option, and the need to share the knowledge produce
through the experiments. In this regard, two main organizational designs can be
considered:
— the « mainlining » strategy gathering all the partners in an « club », exploring
the potential of one alternative, allowing the sharing of knowledge, and
— a network of simultaneous competing technological projects, allowing a
synchronic exploration of the technological variety
The NASP programme was dedicated to the design of radical technology
innovation system, and then was basically characterized by a structural uncertainty
arising from the structural change it involved in the technological basis. In this case, the
lack of guide mark resulted from technological discontinuities in the innovation process.
Moreover, the research activities were impeded by strong indivisibilities in the research
outcomes needed for the design and demonstration of an hypersonic airbreathing
propulsion system. This situation was due to the specific properties of the knowledge
about hypersonic technology — strong compacity, low scalability and low analogic
connections with other scientific and/or technological fields. This creates a strong need
for the production of new infratechnologies, instrumentalities and research
infrastructures, i.e. infrastructural knowledge and infrastructure facilities. In this case,
the adoption of the “mainlining approach” in the management of the programme can be
justified.
Key-words : NASP Programme, Mission-oriented research programmes, Basic
Research, Organizational dynamics, Diversity, Standardization, Structural
Uncertainty, Hypersonic airbreathing propulsion technology, Scramjet,
Infratechnologies.
JEL Classification : O3.
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Introduction
The growing globalization of technology and the deeper integration of the world
economy have generated an ongoing debate in economics focused on the role of the
policy makers in the technological change dynamics and questioned the efficient design
of national technological policies (Branscomb & Florida [1997], Fransman [1995]). As
Branscomb [1993] stated :
« Economic competitiveness will no longer be left to a laissez-faire economic
policy ; government will share costs of base technology development with
commercial firms » (Branscomb [1993], p. 7).
It prompts a rethinking of the rationale of mission-oriented research programmes.
Mission-oriented research programmes are generally initiated by the policy maker, in
partnership with the industry, in order to impulse R&D and advance technical
innovation in high technology industries. Are these national technology programmes
doomed to fail or can they be justified ?
The aim of this article is to examine this argument critically with reference to the
American NASP programme — National Aero Space Plane — devoted to the
demonstration and development of hypersonic airbreathing propulsion technologies for
aerospace applications.
Traditionally linked with the post Second World War technology policies in
industrialized countries such as the United-States or France, mission-oriented research
programs are known to have usually failed (Ergas [1987]). The American SST -
SuperSonic Transportation program and the much more controversial project of
Concorde1 are some famous examples of failures. In the economic literature on
technical change, it has frequently been suggested that those mission-oriented programs
are too costly and tend to survive failure. Most of the economists criticize heavily :
- their centralized organization (Cohen, Edelman & Noll [1991]);
- their high cost that encourages a narrowing in the range of the options
explored (Collingridge [1991]) ;
- and their technical complexity that restricts participation in program
execution to a few, technologically sophisticated agents, (see Ergas [1992],
p.3).
Then, the economist faces an interesting paradox between :
- On the one hand, the policy makers’ unanimity to adopt mission-oriented
program as an instrument of technological policy during the last half
century, and,
- On the other hand, the economists’ unanimity to inform against the high
probability of expensive failure (Cohen, Edelman & Noll [1991]) that can
survive a long time.
However, looking at those mission programmes through the evolutionary glasses
reveals that their organizational management is challenged by a dilemma between
variety and standardization in the learning process (Cowan & Foray [1995]), in a
context of technological discontinuities. Such a trade-off between variety and
standardization corresponds to the evolutionary dilemma between exploration and
exploitation (March [1991]), and between static and dynamic efficiency (Klein [1977]).
Exploration is linked to experimentation, flexibility, discovery, innovation and dynamic
efficiency, while exploitation corresponds to choice, selection, implementation, and
static efficiency. The development of a pure strategy of exploration causes the system to
suffer the costs of experimentation without benefiting from the diversity generated
simply because of a lack of coordination. The risk associated with a pure strategy of
                                                
1
 The case of Concorde is quite different from the American SST failure, as the project has been
recognized to be a commercial failure, not a technical one.
exploitation is to become locked-in a suboptimal state. Thus, the stake is to maintain an
appropriate balance between exploration and exploitation as a necessary condition to
keep the dynamic efficiency in the long run.
To avoid the risk of being locked-in on a wrong technological option, the policy
maker should adopt a network approach based on the conduct of decentralized parallel
experiments in order to explore simultaneously the technological variety. But such
programs deal with complex technology challenges that involved basic research
activities to remove the knowledge frontier. Thus they are characterized by structural
uncertainty. To decrease this structural uncertainty, it is needed to create common pools
of knowledge about the radically new technology as it was the case in the American
NASP programme, a mission-oriented programme dedicated to the conception of a
hypersonic space plane.
Such characteristics call for clubbing together the research partners of the program
in a single entity in order to produce the standard knowledge required to explore
sequentially the technological variety.
Clearly in this case, the organizational dilemma between learning from diversity
and learning from standardization can be solved only by taking into account the specific
characteristics of the research stake.
1. The case of the National AeroSpace Plane
Program
The NASP was a three-phase research, development, test and evaluation program
— RDTE — undertaken in the mid of the eighties, to develop and demonstrate
hypersonic and transatmospheric, single-stage-to-orbit — SSTO — technologies that
will support national security and commercial applications and could provide economies
in space launch costs (Augenstein & alii [1993).
Low-cost — or at least affordable — access to space satisfying NASA and
US’ strategic plans was the primary goal of the NASP program. The focus was then to
reduce the cost of space access to hundreds of dollars per pound and provide the core
research and technology needed for the next 25 years ; i.e. advanced technologies in
aeronautics — transatmospheric — and space transportation systems
(Barthelemy [1989]) so as to enable the American aerospace launch vehicle industry to
compete in a global market.
The main purpose of the NASP was a multi-year technology demonstration effort
to show that a range of technologies — including airbreathing propulsion, advanced
aerodynamics, materials and structure, fuel systems, avionics, and the computational
fluid dynamics — could lead to the development, fabrication, and flight testing of an
experimental flight vehicle called X-30. Critical technologies concern the propulsion
system.
The research effort was strongly focused on the design of a new airbreathing
propulsion engine : the scramjet. This propulsion system would allow the design of a
space aircraft capable to attain satellite speeds and to reach orbit, having take-off like a
regular airplane, and returning to the earth once its mission is accomplished. Space
station re-supply would be far cheaper than with systems requiring launching of rockets
that cannot be recovered or reused. An aerospace transport vessel, in contrast, could be
flown repeatedly. Another application of the technologies would have been the
production of a civil transatmospheric transport vehicle travelling at Mach 8. The
starting point was that a hypersonic transport might prove an attractive option for the
long-distance market in the next century. It could fly at altitudes of 20 miles or higher
and at five times the speed of sound or greater. Travelers would reach far distant
destinations within two hours.
In order to manage the NASP program it was necessary to progress in advancing
structures, thermal protection systems, propulsion, and vehicle technology in the
primary area of advanced reusable transportation technologies. The NASP programme
was supported by a strong optimism : «We have the capability to integrate these
technologies in the experimental X-30, which should begin validation in actual flight by
the early 1990's » (Executive Office of the President, OSTP [1987], p.10).
The requirement to fly forces advanced vehicle concepts and related technology
efforts, such as the X-30 lifting body and propulsion system to become more integrated
and to place additional focus on system technology demonstration.
1.1. Inflexible Technology and the Risk of Costly Failure
But some people criticized this ambitious enterprise as Collingridge [1990] who
claimed :
« The national aerospace plane will do nothing to promote the technical diversity
of the space programme. It is likely to repeat the errors of the Shuttle, having such
large sunk costs that it will have to be used intensively » (Collingridge [1990],
p.197).
According to him, the adoption of technologies involving large-scale shifts away
from the status quo cannot permit low-cost control of technology or lead to successful
performance in policy.
The NASP has all the indicative properties of what he describes as complex
inflexible technologies (Collingridge [1992]). As he has sought to explain, the degree of
inflexibility of the technology allows to account of its non-incremental nature. This
inflexibility, which makes the development of the technology peculiarly prone to costly
errors, has been shown to obtain where the technology in question possesses at least the
following four characteristics :
(1) large-unit size;
(2) long lead-time;
(3) high capital intensity;
(4) dependence on specialized infrastructure.
Despite some unique technical and functional merits, such as recovering satellites
from orbit while at the same time being reusable, NASP might proved a hugely
expensive failure because (I) it represents a large change from anything that existed
earlier, and (ii) the risk of failure results in its development and operation under a
decision making process of considerable centralization. Whatever the route chosen,
many regard such an organization as positively inimical to fostering the flexibility that
is necessary to search for an “optimal” design.
Following the doctrine of Incrementalism (Collingridge [1990]), technologies
should be developed in a piece-meal, experimental way involving a series of trials. This
demand is most easily met when decisions are made in a decentralized, pluralistic way.
By contrast, the development of an inflexible technology involves highly centralized
decision making dominated by large organizations, able to transfer risk in some way to
government, thereby excluding many legitimate stakeholders. Thus, the policy maker
should look for technical alternatives that are more flexible, some of which may be
developed in a more decentralized way. Those arguments are consistent with the
analysis of Cohen, Edelman & Noll [1991].
1.2. Organization of the NASP Program  : A Matter at Issue
Cohen, Edelman & Noll [1991] described the organization of NASP as being
similar to the great Japanese government-industry collaborations of the 1970s and the
1980s (see Fransman [1990]). NASP was drawn out of the American industrial-
government structure to form a new entity that incorporated expertise from both the
public and private sectors that, previously, had been dispersed throughout the national
research system. Innovative partnership has been formed that strengthens the alliance
between industry and the government, thus enabling the costs and risk sharing. The
members of the “club” were Mc Donnel Douglas, General Dynamics, Rockwell, Pratt
&Whitney, and Rocketdyne. The National Program Office, managed by NASA and the
Department of Defense, assumed the function of program coordinator.
According to Cohen, Edelman & Noll [1991], NASP’s organization — described
as an “innovative team” approach — had two drawbacks. First, the grouping of all
available expertise into a single entity in fact narrowed the range of alternative
development paths that were explored. Consideration of a wider range of technological
options that could have catalyzed broader industrial involvement in the program was,
therefore, inhibited.
Second, « The innovative team approach [made] the program more difficult to kill
if NASP [became] nothing more than an expensive toy. Involving all of the important
players in the aerospace industry eliminates short-term sources of political attack
because it [picked] no winners and has no competitive external R&D effort. Involving
multiple government agencies creates a stable support coalition within government »
(Cohen, Edelman & Noll [1991], p.53). Cohen & alii have further suggested that the
choice of organizational centralization was more a reflection of political pressure than
of any attempt to achieve technical and economic optimization. They claimed that this
organizational design increases the likelihood of failure, i.e. it raises the risk of missing
the best design, and the cost of the event of failure.
Certainly in this case, the centralized organizational structure of the NASP
program a priori strongly impedes the exploration of the requisite diversity. From an
economic point of view, such a curtailment of diversity is bound to lead to reduce
resource-allocation efficiency in the relevant research area. What can be said in
response to the above evaluation?
The critique appears to be relevant : a unified organizational form increases the
risk of missing the best design. It also increases the cost of a possible failure regarding
the selected technological trajectory. Nonetheless, the adoption of such an
organizational design can be justified, as far as it is taken into account of the effective
tasks performed in the course of the research program, and in particular the need to
conduct basic research activities in order to reach the radically new technological goals.
2. Exploring the Technological Diversity
The NASP program was clearly facing a situation of structural uncertainty2 about
the performance and function that the hypersonic and transatmospheric technologies
could assume in the future. Consistently it would render the necessity to scan the
technological variety, i.e. a large number of possible “design candidates”, before any
commitment is made to a particular system design. Therefore, facing such a structural
uncertainty, the rationality in the organizational management of the NASP should have
led to incremental development, flexible management schedules, consistent with the
exploration of different technical paths (Cohen, Edelman & Noll [1991], p.53).
This implies a form of organization that will exploit the virtues of diversity and
that will promote option generation and facilitate experimentation along different
trajectories. According to Ergas [1994], option generation refers to the process by which
alternative design approaches are developed, tested and selected. The efficiency of
option generation is greatly affected by the range of alternatives being explored and by
the speed and integrity with which the results of exploratory efforts are transmitted
within the technological community involved. Both contribute to the learning process of
technological variety.
In the case of NASP, one should aim to create a system capable of handling
multiple, decentralized projects, such procedure of investigation being one way to
explore a broad range of the possible technological and functional spectra. The final
orientation of the entire program toward a single, predetermined area should have been
decided after the completion of many pilot projects and a broad base of experimentation
(Cohen & Noll [1991], p.42, David & Rothwell [1996]). Such an organizational form is,
however, difficult to establish, on one hand because of the need to arrange some form of
financial compensation for those projects not selected — the technological orphans
(David [1987]) — and on the other hand because the information generated by the
different experiments must be effectively shared. In other words, such a system must
include mechanisms and procedures for exchanging and distributing information
produced in the course of individual projects, while, at the same time, it must be
centralized enough to assess options, decide upon the timing, and select the
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 Drawing from Shackle [1972], Langlois [1984] established a typology of different type of
uncertainty. He distinguished the parametric uncertainty from the structural one. Parametric uncertainty
refers to a situation of parametric change, that is, change of certain known variables within a known
framework. At the most radical extreme structural change designates change in the very structure leading
to an indeterminate problem whose set of potential solutions (i.e. states of the world) is unknown, i.e.
structural uncertainty.
configuration to be chosen as the standard in the program overall. In that case, it can
create an incentive for agents to become “free riders” and avoid the cost of participating
in any of the experiments.
Moreover, it is only when uncertainties can be overcome that is it possible to
create an environment in which the experience of one agent reduces, rather than
exacerbates, the uncertainties of the others and so fosters a process of cross-fertilization
in which the final design will emerge.
In the case of the hypersonic programme, the structural uncertainty results from
structural change. From the foregoing, here, it is useful to refer to the evolutionary
economic approach of technological change dynamics.
2.1. Technological Paradigms and Conventions of Technical
Change
In the framework of the economics of technical change, it is commonly referred to
the existence of a technological paradigm to explain the regularity in the development
of a technological path (Dosi [1988,1984]). This cumulative and path-dependent chaotic
process, in which “small historical events” play a crucial role in the orientation of
technological trajectories (David [1985]), is relentlessly exposed to irreversibility as a
result of the market-driven diffusion process of technologies in the presence of
increasing returns to adoption (cf. Arthur [1988,1989], David [1987]). This tendency
seems reinforced by the emergence of self-fulfilling prophecies among the
technologists, i.e. what I call a “convention of technical change”, as a structure of
mutually consistent expectations (see David [1994]) about the future course of technical
change.
Such a convention of technical change can be described as a set of design
parameters, which embodies the principles that will generate both the physical
configuration of the product and the process and materials from which it is to be
constructed. It refers to the notion of technological regime as described by Georghiou &
alii [1986], p.34) : « The basic design parameters are the heart of the technological
regime, and they constitute a framework which is shared by the firms in the industry ».
It corresponds to the definition of a self-reinforcing institution as is stressed by
Vanberg ([1994, p.7) :
« […] as configurations of interconnected and mutually-stabilizing behavioral
routines. They are constituted by routines practices of number of persons that are
functionally interlaced and reinforce each other in a mutually-stabilizing manner.»
Such a conventional institution guides the behavior of designers of advanced new
technologies, as the famous Moore’s Law3 regulating the technological path in the
industry of integrated circuits since the 1960s4. This evolution was consistent with what
Dosi [1984] called a paradigm that is to say the pattern of technical change in the
semiconductor industry mixing four main directions of progress : increasing
miniaturization, increasing speed, increasing reliability and decreasing costs. In the era
of integrated circuits, increasing miniaturization is a function of increasing density, i.e.
increasing number of components on a single chip.
« […] because of the unique nature of the technology, by making things smaller the
speed of the circuits increases, power consumption drops, system reliability
increases significantly, and, most importantly, the cost of the electronic system
drops » (Moore [1996], p.56).
But if the paradigm gives the direction of technical change, the convention
specifies the oriented movement by giving precise indications about the rhythm and
eventually about the timing of technical change. The convention operates as a perceived
exogenous constraint that defines the orientation and the rhythm of technical change. It
can be analyzed as a self-fulfilling prophecy : its institutional content reduces the
uncertainty about the path of technical change, and its salience helps the coordination of
the technological expectations of the engineers in reference to a focal point. It appears
to be a powerful driving force for technological standardization.
The convention of technical change plays the role of shared cognitive maps as
structures of mutual consistent expectations about the course of technological dynamics.
But when an unexpected technological breakthrough appears, one can call such a
disruptive evolution a paradigmatic transition. Then, the reference to the old cognitive
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 Moore’s law is not based on any scientific demonstration. It has been infered by Gordon Moore
who observed in 1965 that the number of individual components on integrated was doubling each year
since 1959, when the integrated circuit was patented by two engineers from Fairchild Semiconductor
Corporation. In an article, published in April 1965 in Electronics Magazine, he extrapolated this
exponential growth for another decade and came up with an astounding projection : that the circuits of
1975 would contain some 65,000 devices. Now enshrined as Moore’s Law, his prediction has continued
to hold true for over three decades, though the doubling period has grown to about eigtheen months. The
most advanced chips today contain millions of transistors — each with typical dimensions of less than
half a micron. According to Moore, this trend has been reinforced by the specific properties of the
technology : « A unique aspect of the semiconductor industry is that prices for products tend to decrease
over time. […] Not only does the price fall for a given integrated circuit, but as the complexity of the chip
increases, the price per electronics function decreases from product generation to generation as more and
more functions are integrated into a single structure » (Moore [1996], p.56).
4
 The semiconductor industry began in 1947 with the invention of the transistor at the Bell
Telephone Laboratory. A transistor is the building block of digital logic and memory circuits
(Moore [1996], p.55). An integrated circuit (IC) is a device performing more than one function on a
single ship, i.e., it embodies more than one component, either active or passive — for example, several
transistors connected through patterns ‘written’ on the chip (cf. Dosi [1984], p.23).
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framework is no longer possible. As the technological goal induces a paradigmatic shift,
a new set of cognitive and social practices has to merge which are different from those
that govern the old paradigm. The economic agents have then to deal with what may be
call radical uncertainty.
2.2. New Priorities for Space Launch Vehicles and the Need
for Hypersonic Airbreathing Propulsion Technology
In the case of the NASP program, what is important to stress is the fact that the
technological objective of building an aerospace plane lies beyond the limits of the
performance criteria that have hitherto governed the technological evolution of space
launch engines (McLean [1985]).
Since the beginning of the sixties, the development of space propulsion
technologies has been shaped through the emergence of a “stable” orientation for
technological progress on the basis of criteria associated with cost and industrial
implementation. These criteria emphasized the need to deal primarily with the problems
of acceleration speed and orbital access. This orientation, rendering the existence of
“standard operating procedures to generate technological change”, was compatible with
the technological option of rocket engines. Moreover, the incredible magnitude of
federal R&D expenditures in aerospace industries combined with the concentration on
military-oriented R&D performed by government agencies like NASA in partnership
with the Department of Defense, allowed to neglect the industrial potential of aerospace
transport systems (Pace [1990], Macauley [1986]), and therefore, make it possible to
ignore issues of reutilization, operability, and payload mass.
However, in the case of the hypersonic program, the advanced research objective
clearly marked the end of this kind of technological change convention. The challenge
was to try to reconcile the different and possibly contradictory sets of performance
requirements that were previously applied exclusively, either to aeronautic or to space
systems, by trying to unite in a single propulsion system, the economic advantages of
airplane engines — cost, ratio to mass, operability, maintenance — and the performance
criteria of rockets, in terms of flight speed and orbital access. The development of
reusable launch vehicles appeared to hold great promise as the key to unlocking the vast
potential of space business exploitation. Unfortunately, while a great improvement over
current systems, the cost per pound delivered to orbit for currently proposed systems
would still be greater than that needed to exploit space for many business uses. One of

the limiting factors in potential reductions for chemical rockets is the Ips limit —
specific impulse.
The change in the performance criteria has involved the conviction that the
technology portion of the program should concentrate on airbreathing propulsion
technologies. The ultimate success of this project depended, first, on solving the
propulsion problems associated with the use of airbreathing engines5.
Airbreathing propulsion technology offers substantial advantages for hypersonic
flight, notably :
- The use of airbreathing engines holds potential for very significant increases
in Ips which could result in a significantly lower cost per pound to orbit : an
improvement in mass ratio of the order of 3 to 5 in comparison with the
mass placed into orbit by non-airbreathing propulsion — rocket engines —,
made possible because airbreathing engines utilize air as the combustive
agent, removing the need for mass-loaded oxygen for combustion in
rockets ;
- The possibility of vehicle reutilization, thus eliminating costly replacement
or in the best case, the recovery of the space vehicle which means — as for
the American Space Shuttle — reconfiguring and refurbishing the vehicle
after each flight — the so-called refurbishment phase ;
- The ability to take off and land horizontally as well as the elimination of
auxiliary solid fuel rockets and other types of launch support ;
- Adaptation of maintenance practices that are closer to the airplane ones than
to the rocket maintenance, therefore requiring less retraining of the ground
staff.
This contrasts with a rocket-powered vehicle’s operational penalties — such as
large infrastructure requirements—, and its need to transport its own oxidant for
combustion exacts large payload penalties. As a result, airbreathing propulsion is an
essential ingredient for sustained endoatmospheric hypersonic cruise applications such
as “global reach” vehicles, and can significantly improve the performance of space
launch vehicles.
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 The aerobe or airbreathing principle is distinguished by the utilization of oxygen from air —
taken up from the atmosphere — as the combustible agent, whereas rocket propulsion requires the
loading of both fuel and combustible agents — anaerobe or non-airbreathing principle.
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At the sought-after flight speeds — beyond Mach 5 — supersonic combustion
becomes necessary6. In other words, the pacing airbreathing hypersonic technology is
certainly the scramjet engine. The tricky problem of developing the existing propulsion
technology — called ramjet — into a fully functioning supersonic combustion ramjet —
called a “scramjet” — is thought to require a critical combination of the airbreathing
principle with the hypersonic speeds. Nevertheless, airbreathing ramjet/scramjet —
supersonic combustion ramjet — engines could improve mission effectiveness by
reducing on-board propellant load in favor of payload and by increasing operational
flexibility.
2.3. Presumptive Anomaly as the Dynamo of Paradigmatic
Shift
According to Constant [1973], a paradigmatic change is precipitated by the
intuition of the occurrence of what he calls a “presumptive anomaly”. A presumptive
anomaly arises in the existing analytical framework from the scientific evidence that
conventional technologies cannot perform some new missions and/or reach new levels
of performance. This means that attempts to extend the existing paradigm to a new set
of problems are expected to fail to provide “satisfactory” answers. In time, this
generates the “presumption” that the existing paradigm is fundamentally flawed and
stimulates a search for new ways of looking at things.
In the case under consideration, the anomaly is expressed in terms of a growing
conviction —or evidence — that conventional airbreathing propulsion systems will not
function at hypersonic speeds. The existence of this presumption prompts the
expectation of further possible technical/functional anomalies in design that also creates
pressure for a new paradigm.
Historically, the fastest airbreathing engine-powered airplane, the SR-71, can
cruise just above Mach 3, about 60% of the Mach 5 transition to the hypersonic regime.
Ramjet powered vehicles have flirted with the hypersonic threshold. History’s only
hypersonic airplane, the Mach 6.7 X-15 of the 1960s, used only rockets — as have all
space flight launch vehicles to date, the expendable ones and the reusable Shuttle alike.
It is argued by some that there is no point in trying to design a hypersonic jet on
the basis of a technology — airbreathing propulsion — when existing science suggests
that the principle cannot be applied at hypersonic speeds.
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 Hypersonic speed is obtained from supersonic combustion, just as supersonic speed is obtained
from subsonic combustion in a ramjet.
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Thus, the presumptive anomaly, though it arises primarily within science, brings
in its train a technical/functional anomaly and that affects, adversely, progress in design
and development. Despite the fact that there is no functional failure here, the
presumption of a theoretical anomaly spills over to the design dimension and constraints
the full momentum of development in the hope that analytical work will one day be able
to clarify the situation.
In brief, such a complex change implies discontinuities, both scientific and
technological. The two traditional supports for the elaboration of new technological
designs — scientific models and the design experience of preceding technological
generations, the supersonic “ramjet” — cannot be used effectively here, because they
provide only certain, very limited guidance. These can be seen in the case of hypersonic
flight — first, in the difficulty of developing predictive models and second, in the
inability of previous experience with “ramjet” to compensate for the absence of these
models. Progress, apparently blocked on both fronts, spurs on the search for a new
paradigm.
The challenge depends not only on the allocation of financial or human resources,
as important as they are. The main difficulty lies in the lack of a sufficiently robust
analytical framework to guide both research activity and technological design. As a
matter of fact, designing a hypersonic aircraft requires the exploration of a new
paradigm to solve the propulsion issues.
It is now described in greater detail why the design of a scramjet requires a
fundamental change in technological paradigm.
3. Technological Discontinuities as a Source of
Structural Uncertainty
On the basis of the above mentioned considerations, the NASP program was
clearly facing a situation of structural change as the building of a hypersonic space
plane renders the transition to a new technical change convention. In turn, this transition
through new performance criteria has induced a paradigmatic change regarding the
technological basis.
The structural uncertainty of the NASP program was due to the indetermination
faced by the research partners that concerned both the ways one should carry out the
research as well as the finality of the research in terms of application of the results.
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3.1. Difficulties with Experimentation and the Lack of Scientific
Data
In the case of supersonic combustion — Mach 5-6 —, the first difficulty is that it
is almost impossible to produce the ground-based scientific data needed in order to
validate the “scramjet” concept and predict its performance in a particular vehicular
form. Indeed, ground-based test capacities and experimental installations – i.e.
technological infrastructures — do not yet exist for vehicles flying beyond Mach 8.
There are no installations capable of reproducing the combination of speeds, pressures,
and temperatures necessary to stimulate hypersonic flight. In addition, ground-based
experiments are of extremely short duration. For example, hypersonic wind tunnel tests
generally last less than a few seconds because of the great quantities of energy required.
Suitably sized installations are needed for the experimental verification of propulsion
and aerodynamics concepts beyond Mach 8 (US GAO [1988], Sullivan [1991],
Piland [1991]).
This weakness in experimental apparatus can be partially overcome by using
computational simulation methods. Here, however, the scientists faced two difficulties :
the absence of predictive law for the modeling of turbulence in the study of laminar
flows and the difficulty of solving the supersonic combustion equations (Harsha &
Waldman [1989], Bogue & Erbland [1993]). The latter requires substantial computer
power because of the long calculation times involved. All simulations, therefore, need
to make a significant number of approximations, but even if theses can be justified they
do not eliminate the need for experimental tests. Nonetheless, simulations do enable
researchers to limit wind tunnel tests to those precise areas where simulations alone are
either too difficult or do not provide sufficiently precise results. Simulations may reduce
the quantity of experimental work necessary, but they do not eliminate it altogether.
In the final analysis, the current difficulties of ensuring synergy between
simulations and real tests reveal that science is still far from being able to provide
predictive models on which a design configuration might be based. If further research is
blocked by lack of theoretical guidance, could not this weakness be, at least partially,
overcome by using other sources of information, such as concepts and design ideas
inherited from previous technological generations?
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3.2. The Gap between the New and the Previous Technical
Regime
The required paradigm change is driven in part by the fact that the results obtained
at the threshold of Mach 5 are no longer valid beyond Mach 5, For example, certain
physic-chemical laws are reversed as velocities pass from the supersonic to the
hypersonic domain (Barthelemy [1989]). Beyond Mach 5, air no longer behaves as a
perfect gas ; beyond Mach 8, properties dependent upon temperature and even
dissociation phenomena become dominant : « as a result of kinetic chemical phenomena
of increasing significance, simple extrapolation parameters no longer exists which can
be applied to the domain of supersonic combustion.» (Barthelemy [1989]).
Here it is useful to refer to the notions of homotopic and non-homotopic mappings
— or correspondences —, analogic links, and technological lumpiness developed by
David, Mowery & Steinmueller [1992] for the purpose of assessing the potential of
“transferability” of knowledge generated by one basic research program to another, not
necessarily basic research program (Conesa [1997]).
The economic analysis of the payoffs of basic research outcomes, due to David,
Mowery & Steinmueller [1992] explores the implications of the R&D externalities in
the symptomatic case of the physics of high energy particles, and tries to assess the role
played by the spillovers in basic research. Such a framework focuses on the
informational outputs of basic research and the connections among these outputs,
applied research and innovation. It emphasizes the interaction between basic and
applied research activities « […] as the ultimate source of the economic benefits of
basic research» (David, Mowery & Steinmueller [1992], p.80).
They started from the assumption that the number and richness of links between
the knowledge generated by basic scientific projects and other scientific and applied
research endeavors are important determinants of the potential economic returns from
discoveries in a specific discipline.
They distinguished between two types of links, “homotopic mappings” and
“analogic links”. The first ones refers to scientific information that is potentially
applicable to problems quite far removed from those of concern in the original inquiry.
Such information is said to be homotopically mapped to different scientific or applied
research problems. The conclusion is that once a theory exhibits such homotopic
mappings, progress in other fields of basic and applied research can focus on issues of
practical implementation rather than on the discovery of new phenomena. This notion
helps to anticipate the pace and impact of progress within a scientific field in which the

examination of a portion of an entire system of interrelated phenomena provides useful
generalizations and applications in other areas. The analogic links between knowledge
from basic and applied research « are based on the surmise that nature is conservative in
the use of concepts and structures, and posit that physical regularities in one field
underlie other natural phenomena » (David, Mowery & Steinmueller [1992], p.85)7.
Thus, the existence of “homotopic mappings” or “analogic links” help to delimit
the area of application of the results obtained in basic research. Such an economic
analysis highlights the existence of discontinuities , beyond a certain threshold, in the
validity of knowledge produced in the study of physical phenomena. The lack of
scalability8 resulting from the absence of homotopic correspondences, means that the
results obtained can not be extrapolated to another range of size. Each of these notions
has implications for the empirical examination of mission-oriented basic research
programs. The indivisibility of research activities, what David, Mowery &
Steinmueller [1992] called the property of “lumpiness”, is an additional characteristic of
basic research projects. It may influence the formation of these homotopic mappings
and analogic links.
First, in the transition to the hypersonic domain, the homotopic correspondences9
between the concepts developed at different velocity levels are weak. This means that
extending existing concepts cannot bridge the discontinuity between the supersonic and
the hypersonic domains by additional, modest improvements in existing facilities and
human resources. Further, the “analogic links” between older rockets and the newer
airbreathing propulsion technologies are relatively insignificant (Conesa [1997]). This
means that there was only a limited number of opportunities to transfer practical design
and development experience from one domain to the other : Harsha & Waldman [1989]
emphasized that « The installation requirements for aerodynamic experimentation and
propulsion systems appear to be quite different depending upon whether they concern
the development of a shuttle or a scramjet demonstrator.»
                                                
7
 The concept of symmetry, applied in mathematics and physics, as well as chemistry and
crystallography, is a good example of an analogical link allowing for the extension of theoretical results
from one domain to another (cf. David, Mowery & Steinmueller [1992]).
8 Scaling is a way of dealing with different levels of aggregation. The main implication of
scalability is that it is possible to move between different levels of aggregation.
9
 The methods and results may or may not be extrapolated to every size of range. The notion of
“homotopic correspondence” comes from topology : two correspondences are said to be homotopic if one
of them can be deformed continually within the other. This, in mechanics, a theory predicting the reaction
of a physical object to attraction by an external force will be true for any object of greater mass. The
relationship between force and mass is unaffected by changes in the mass parameter (cf. David, Mowery
& Steinmueller [1992]).
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Finally, weaknesses in both the homotopic correspondences and analogic links
imply that new facilities will be needed, and this creates a degree of “technological
lumpiness” and new, large-scale investments in facilities and information are bound to
alter the expected economic returns from the program. The property of “lumpiness” is
derived from the fact that the production of new results requires the prior resolution of a
greater or lesser number of sub-problems in the research area. This lumpiness may be
either informational — the minimum of sub-problems to solve — or material — the
minimum of required experimental installations. This property is no doubt particularly
pronounced where the homotopic correspondences are weak (cf. David, Mowery &
Steinmueller [1992]).
4. The Need for Technological Infrastructures and
Organizational Integration
The fact that a problem is perceived in terms of paradigmatic change implies that
researchers believe that accumulated knowledge and experience on its own provides
insufficient guidance as to how proceed. As a consequence, experts can argue that
because the existing science has no guidance to offer in the new domain, it is imperative
to push further the scientific agenda before exploring the hypersonic technologies’
applications. In this way, it effectively puts a block on both further experimentation and
organizational innovation.
It can be argued that, before the bottleneck can be broken, there is a need to build
up a new technological base — that is to gather data and develop the methods of
investigation, i.e. the infratechnologies needed, and to produce the techniques and
research infrastructures and instrumentation that will form the basis for establishing the
research agenda before choosing a design configuration.
4.1. The Very Nature of the Research Outputs : The Production
of Infratechnologies as a First Priority
Indeed, the situation outlined in the previous section highlights the need for new
infratechnologies (Tassey [1991,1996]), experimental methods and instrumentation in
order to make progress on the design and development of a hypersonic airplane.
Following Tassey [1991], the infratechnologies can be defined as the instrumental basis
of R&D, including :
« the scientific data necessary for operations of measurement, test control, and trial
; methods and research instruments, techniques, and knowledge. Infratechnologies
are the basis of technological development in that they enable precise
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measurements and furnish scientific and technical data, evaluated and organized,
necessary to the understanding, characterization, and interpretation of pertinent
research results. Infratechnologies are linked to the basic units of measure. In
addition, infratechnologies incorporate the concepts and techniques of
measurement and testing which allow for increased quality.»
The absence of this technological basis makes it extremely difficult to identify
which particular strategic research or design questions need to be addressed. This, in
turn, creates what is referred to as a situation of uncertainty within the program itself. In
other word, the instrumental basis for R&D within a new paradigm is completely
lacking. In the case of the NASP programme De Meis stated  : « Lots of things need to
be measured that we do not know how to measure » (De Meis [1990], p.34). Thus,
analyzing the content of the research carried out enables us to define the hypersonic
programs as “oriented toward the production of adequate infratechnologies and
instrumentalities” required for the achievement of the exploration of the hypersonic
propulsion area.
According to Rosenberg ([1992], p.385),
« Scientific instruments may be usefully regarded as the capital goods of the
scientific research industry. That is to say, the conduct of research requires some
antecedent investment in specific equipment for purposes of enhancing the ability
to observe and measure specific categories of natural phenomena.»
This phase of research is crucial and has to precede whatever basic and applied
research activities will eventually be undertaken. It contains a strong technological
dimension. As a result, the appropriate organizational form should be subject to the
requirements of collective production of the infratechnologies and research
infrastructures needed to create what amounts to the “conditions of possibility” of
taking the project forward. Because these conditions will influence both subsequent
research and design considerations, they also constitute the “collective” dimension of
the project.
Then, the difficulty is to produce simultaneously infrastructural knowledge of two
type : the first type deals with the production of infratechnologies and instrumentalities
required by the paradigmatic shift. To be infrastructural, this type of knowledge must be
collectively used and, thus, has to be public and diffused in “codified” form. The second
type deals with the information generated and diffused by the different experiments. To
be infrastructural, this second type of knowledge must be shared and possess a strong
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“public good” aspect, that is to say being persistent10, and exhibiting non-rival and non-
exclusive properties.
4.2. Creating Common Pools of Knowledge
It is clear that the NASP program with its strong technological composition has
been — effectively — in just such a preliminary phase (Bogue & Erbland [1993]). How
then does one produce infratechnologies and instrumentation that will constitute the
new technological base, given the weakness of scientific support, and the discontinuities
marking the transition from the supersonic to the hypersonic domain? The first objective
has been to push back the frontier of experimentation “on the ground” rather than “in
the air”11, so that to produce the experimental infrastructures required to pursue the
ground tests. Second, it has been necessary to develop computer simulations —
 numerical simulation or computer modeling — for fluid dynamics to enable the
prediction of the performance and flight characteristics at speeds beyond ground-
experimentation capacities. However, vehicle performance calculated in this way can
vary and is greatly dependent upon the hypotheses embodied in the computer codes.
Thus, a first task was to verify vehicle design methods, using the correlation between
simulation and experimentation12 (Bogue & Erbland [1993]). As a result, the eventual
NASP engine — the experimental vehicle X 30 — would not — yet — have been a
prototype or even an “R&D instrument”. Rather, it can accurately be described as a
demonstration vehicle or “basic” research instrument enabling the production of
infratechnologies and instrumentalities necessary for further research and development.
No possibilities existed for incremental research and step by step approaches. The
weakness of homotopic correspondences and analogic links both precluded this and, at
the same time, revealed the need of lumpy technological — and — research projects.
Thus, the production of infratechnologies has to be based on an experimentation-
simulation relationship and should result in the design of demonstration vehicles for the
production of flight data. It is only on the basis of such data that the conventionally
                                                
10
 Knowledge that plays an infrastructural role in industry needs to persist long enough that it can
be recognized and exploited by the organizations not directly involved in its creation (See
Steinmueller [1995]).
11
 After determining that existing Air Force, NASA, industry and university engine test facilities
were not capable of testing scramjets above speeds of Mach 8 for sustained periods, the NASP program
awarded two contracts in October 1986 totaling U.S. $9.6 million for two engine test facilities. These
facilities were expected to provide the capability to test full-scale scramjets up to speeds of Mach 8 (US
GAO [1988]).
12
 For example, government efforts led by NASA-Ames have provided an understanding of how to
safely contain hydrogen, especially during the NASP’s high-temperature flight (Korthals-Altes [1987]).

described “research and development” phases can be undertaken with a minimum of
acceptable efficiency in resource allocation.
What is the most appropriate type of organization to generate such infrastructures
and infratechnologies, given that the chosen organizational form needs to reflect the
“collective” nature of infratechnologies and research infrastructures?
It can be argued that the production of infratechnologies and instrumentation and,
hence, of the related structural flight data, requires the establishment of a specific
organizational form. Because, the arguments runs, infratechnologies constitute the basic
procedures and routines that enable measurements to be collected and compared across
projects carried out at different sites, a high degree of standardization is essential.
Infratechnologies are more than the sum of the experimental routines developed by the
participants and their production cannot be left to the participants alone.
Infratechnologies promote collective research in a complex project such as the
development of the hypersonic aircraft. Infratechnologies are collective goods in that
they require investments that none of the participants individually will feel inclined to
pay for. As technological standards, they have no significance outside their collective
usage in the research process. Yet the generalized diffusion and adoption of this
structural knowledge is essential for the particular program to go forward. This is
consistent with the collective mode of knowledge production in a specific context of
application.
4.3. Infratechnologies and Organizational Integration  :
Lessons from the NASP
Indeed, a set of factors would support the formation of a single entity. One is
derived from the need to produce a collective technology infrastructure gathering the
research instrumentation and the infratechnologies necessary to support the R&D
activity in the hypersonic scientific area. The infratechnologies consist in standards of
measurement, experimental methods and shared modes of comparing and checking
research results that are produced collectively and underlie collective experimentation.
The need for these infratechnologies suggests the desirability of forming a single entity
to produce the required structural knowledge and facilitate its diffusion throughout the
program. However, their “public good” aspects inhibit some, mainly private sector,
participants from investing their resources in technologies from which they cannot
capture direct benefits. Moreover, if it is known that such infrastructural knowledge
(Steinmueller [1995]) has to be widely shared, there will be an incentive for agents to

become “free-riders”, and thus avoid the cost of participating in any of the experiments.
In other words, there is a risk of information being retained by the competing projects
and teams. Besides, the experience cannot be easily shared as it can exhibit some tacit
character
This bottleneck can be broken either directly by means of government investments
in program infrastructure or indirectly via the formation of technological club — such
as the consortia of firms and public agencies. Thus, a mixture of public and private
investments is used jointly to develop the technological infrastructure. The latter is
consistent with the integration and the coordination of dispersed public and private
sources of expertise (Kandebo [1990]).
In the case of NASP, the objective of creating such an entity was then also to
facilitate the sharing of technical results and to enable the formulation of a single
technical design, drawing as much as possible on the research experience of a variety of
individual firms (Cohen, Edelman & Noll [1991], p.51). It was also intended to
establish NASP’s identity clearly and quickly, making it extremely difficult for the new
entity to dissolve into its former, dispersed state. Formally, this was accomplished by
producing specific codes and developing specific communication channels to guide
flows of information in the nascent organization of NASP. For example, an electronic
communications team was created from the beginning with the objective of developing
networks within the contracting system composed of subgroups of independent firms13.
This action brings to mind Arrow’s idea (Arrow [1974]) that codes and information
channels are forms of irreversible organizational capital. Indeed, this strategy imposed
an irreversible character upon organizational investments. A third organizational feature
was the unprecedented level of commitment of public agencies in the research
enterprise. For those government agencies, the integration process — known as
“mainlining” — involved going beyond traditional generic tasks to include research and
experimental instrumentation : « […] mainlining brings the government-run facilities
into positions often played by contract research labs or
subcontractors » (Kandebo [1990]).
                                                
13
 « The team has already developed an unclassified network to develop scheduling and other
plans, and is now working on a classified system to handle electronic transfer of drawings and other
data » (Kandebo [1990]).
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Conclusion
The aim of the NASP program was to develop and demonstrate hypersonic and
transatmospheric single-stage-to-orbit — SSTO —, technologies that will support future
national security and commercial applications and provide economies in space launch
costs. It consisted in a diverse range of specialists to work in teams on problems in a
complex applications-oriented environment. The challenge was to reduce the
technological risk — to become locked-in the wrong technological path — without
impeding the experimentation of the foreseen technological designs.
I claimed that before any organizational and managerial issues could be
addressed, the very nature of the research and technical problems facing the NASP
program has to be analyzed in more detail. In this respect, I attempted to specify in what
respect the existing scientific base and evidence breaks down, and why it appeared
necessary to scientists and technologists to explore the hypersonic area and then to
develop infratechnologies. As far as this investigation can be conducted, the discussion
suggests what kind of organizational problems to be solved it raises for the achievement
of the technological program’s goal.
The rationale behind NASP’s particular choice of organizational design reflects an
attempt to resolve the arising organizational dilemma, trying to balance the two
imperatives of diversity and standardization. The result was that it favored the latter. At
the time the decision was taken, the supporters of NASP seemed to attach greater
importance to the production of a collective research infrastructure than to the broad
exploration of the technological and functional dimensions of possible design
configurations. Investments in the production of the research infrastructure were critical,
despite the great uncertainty attaches to the potential returns from the following
individual projects conducted on the basis of the infrastructural knowledge generated. In
that case, the option of “clubbing together”, i.e. the formation of a single entity grouping
all agents — the partners of the program — in a particular sector — in a central
laboratory — was proving consistent with the need for the rapid creation of irreversible
organizational capital, and with a strong commitment of public agencies in the
production of infratechnologies and technological infrastructures. As a consequence,
there was a preference for the innovative team approach within a unified organizational
form, as opposed to the management of multiple decentralized and “distributed”
experimental and exploratory projects. In brief, this is what happened.
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